Practical Reason and Norms
In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? Joseph Raz answers these three questions by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity.
224 Seiten
Hardcover
Erscheinungsdatum 09.09.1999
ISBN 9780198268345
Joseph Raz is Professor of the Philosophy of Law at the University of Oxford and is Visiting Fellow of Jurisprudence at Columbia University in New York.
Joseph Raz offers an explanation of the normativity of rules, promises, decisions, and orders, of games, and of the law, using an analysis of a special type of reasons, i.e. reasons to exclude other reasons, providing an account of the systematic interdependence of rules in legal and other systems, and an account of types of normative discourse.